Abstract. A (t. n)-locally random reduction maps a problem instance x into a .set of problem instances Yl ..... ?,,,~ in such a way that it is easy to construct the answer to x from the answers to Yl ..... Yn, and yet the distribution on t-element subsets of Yl ..... y, depends only on Ixl. In this paper we formalize such reductions and give improved methods for achieving them. Then we give a cryptographic application, showing a new way to prove in perfect zero knowledge that committed bits xt ..... Xm satisfy some predicate Q. Unlike previous techniques for such perfect zero-knowledge proofs, ours uses an amount of communication that is bounded by a fixed polynomial in m, regardless of the computational complexity of Q.
I. Introduction
We develop and apply a new type of reduction, which we call a locally random reduction.
We begin with some historical motivation and context for our work. Next, we present an improved construction of locally random reductions. Finally, we apply these reductions to zero-knowledge proofs on committed bits.
I. 1. Motivation and Historical Context
The notion of reducibility among computational problems has long had a pervasive influence on the theory of computation. To analyze the average-case complexity of a problem, it often suffices to reduce an arbitrary instance of the problem to a random instance. For example, let p be a prime and let t~ be a generator of Zp. The problem of computing Iog,~ x mod p, where x ~ Zp, can be reduced to that of computing log,~ y mod p, where y is distributed uniformly over Zp. Simply choose r uniformly at random from {1 ..... p -1}, compute y = ~trx mod p, and let log,, x = (Iog,~ y) -r mod(p -' 1).
Thus, a "hard" instance of x can be generated by choosing x at random: If computing log,~ x were easy for a randomly chosen x, then it would be easy for any value of x.
More generally, suppose computing f(x), where Ix l = m, could be randomly reduced to computing g(y), such that y is distributed according to some probability measure Rm. Then the average-case complexity of computing g (y) , where the average is computed with respect to Rm, is as high as the worst-case complexity of computing f(x).
Unfortunately, this approach is limited, because of the following result. Suppose that E~' 5~ II P and that f is NP-hard. Then there is no polynomial-time random reduction from f to any function g such that the distribution on random instances y depends only on Ix l (see [ 1 ] ). This result holds for a generalized notion of random reductions, known as single-oracle instance-hiding schemes. These schemes have a probabilistic polynomialtime bounded player P and an unbounded player O that always answers correctly. P wishes to compute f (x) for some function f and an input x. P is allowed to flip coins and to interact with O for an arbitrary number of rounds but is not allowed to reveal anything more than Ixl to O. Here, "revealing only Ixl to O" means that, if Ixll = Ix21, then O's views of the conversation when x = xl and when x ----x2 are identically distributed. A more precise and general formulation of this idea may be found in [1] .
Rivest [17] , [1 ] proposed the more general notion of multioracle instance-hiding schemes, in which P is allowed to interact with a number of oracles Oi ..... On. P is not allowed to reveal more than Ix l to any single oracle Oi, but two or more oracles together may have enough information to reconstruct x completely. Whereas schemes with only one oracle appear relatively weak, Beaver and Feigenbaum proved the following theorem for multioracle schemes.
Theorem [3] . For any function f, there exists an (Ixl -4-l)-oracle instance-hiding scheme that reveals at most Ix l.
Because any function f: {0, 1} m > {0, 1} can be trivially reduced to a function g: {0, 1} "-c > {0, I}2",the factoroflxl+ 1 may be reduced to a factor of lx l -c lglx l. In fact, we later show how to reduce this to Ixl/c lglxl.
Lipton [15] translated the arguments of 13] into the language of multivariate polynomials and applied them to the area of program testing. This framework is much easier to work with than the original framework, which involved multiparty computations on shared secrets, and furthermore allows useful program-testing results for multivariate polynomials of low degree to be proved. It has been observed that Lipton's programtesting reductions imply average-case complexity results, such as the following theorem on computing permanents over finite fields.
Theorem [15] . Let F be a finite field with more than m + 1 elements. Suppose that, for some probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm P, and for M chosen uniformly from m x m matrices,
Then there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm Q such that, for all m • m matrices M,
Taking the contrapositive, if computing permanents over large finite fields is difficult in the worst case, it must also be difficult for an g2(l/m) fraction of the instances. Since the results of Beaver and Feigenbaum [3] and Lipton [15] appeared, a number of researchers have used random-self-reducibility properties of multivariate polynomials to show, among other things, that P#P c IP (see 116]), IP = PSPACE (see I191), and MIP = NEXPTIME (see [2] ). A detailed overview of the relationship of locally random reductions to other basic concepts in complexity theory can be found in [9] .
Our Results
In this paper, we provide a formal definition of locally random reductions, exhibit an improved general construction of such reductions, and apply them to zero-knowledge proof systems. Informally, a (t, n)-locally random reduction from a function f to a function g works as follows. To compute f(x), we use x and a string r of"random coinflips" to generate Yl ..... y,,. Here n and t depend only on m = Ixl. We recover f(x) by computing simple functions of x, r, and g(Yl) ..... g(y,). Moreover, for any x0 and xl of the same length m, for any il it, the distribution yO ~,0 induced by x0 is v] induced by x~. We prove the following theorem, identical to the distribution yil, . ,, which is stated informally here; a formal statement and proof are given in Section 3. This improves on the results of [3] and [15] mentioned above.
We apply locally random reductions in a novel protocol for zero-knowledge proofs on committed bits. Zero-knowledge proof systems, as originally formulated by Goldwasser et al. [13] , are two-party protocols in which the parties have a common input x, and one party (the prover) convinces the other (the verifier) that, say, f(x) = 1, without revealing anything about x except that f(x) = 1. We consider a related setting in which the prover publishes a commitment to its private input x and then at some later time proves in zeroknowledge to the verifier that f(x) = 1. Furthermore, f may be unknown at the time x is committed.
We consider how to implement such proofs in the presence of an ideal commitment scheme. Both prover and verifier have unlimited computational power, no complexitytheoretic assumptions are made, and an ideal bit commitment scheme is assumed as a primitive. A natural question to ask is whether zero-knowledge proofs can actually be performed on committed bits in this setting. This question has been answered in the affirmative by several researchers (e.g., [5] and [18] ); a written account of a more recent scheme appears in [6] .
It is natural to ask whether an interactive proof system is at all interesting if it requires the verifier as well as the prover to have unlimited computational power. The answer is yes, for the following reason: We are focusing on the communication cost of proving the value of a predicate on a set of committed bits. It is not at all clear (and might even be counterintuitive) that an arbitrary predicate f can be proven in a communicationefficient manner, even if both prover and verifier have enough computational power to compute f. All previous schemes for zero-knowledge proofs on committed bits, including those of [5], [6] , and [18] , have bit complexity proportional to the circuit complexity of f, where by "bit complexity" we mean the total number of bits committed to or communicated between the two players. Thus, if f is an arbitrary predicate on m bits, a zero-knowledge proof that f(x) = 1 will require exponential communication if the protocols of [5] , [61, and [18] , regardless of the amount of computational power one allows the verifier. By applying locally random reductions, we achieve a protocol whose total communication cost is polynomial, even if the circuit complexity of f is exponential. A formal statement and proof of this theorem appears in Section 4.
Although the fact that both prover and verifier in our protocol have unlimited computational power does not detract from the theoretical importance of the fact that the protocol's communication costs are polynomial, it does render the protocol impractical. With respect to practical applicability, our protocol is not an improvement over those of [51, [6] , and [181.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally define locally random reductions and other notions that we use later in the paper. In Section 3 we give our improved construction of locally random reductions. In Section 4 we give our communication-efficient protocol for zero-knowledge proofs on committed bits. Open questions are given in Section 5.
These results first appeared in our Technical Memorandum [4].
Preliminaries

Locally Random Reductions
We now formalize the intuition of Section 1.2. More succinctly, we write "f is (t, n)-lrr to g." When we omit mention of Q, it means that Q(m) is a polynomial but that the specific polynomial involved is unimportant for the result under discussion. In the special case in which f = g, we say that f is "(t, n)-locally random self-reducible."
Informally, if T is a subset of the target instances {Yl ..... Y,,(m)}, and ITI < t(m), then T leaks no information about the original instance x, except its length m.
Function Arithmetization
A powerful technique for dealing with a Boolean function f: {0, 1} m --~ {0, 1} is to treat f as a multivariate polynomial P over some finite field F. In this way, algebraic properties of polynomials can be directly exploited. Such arithmetization of Boolean functions is an important insight of Ben-Or et al. [7] . The polynomial P is sometimes referred to as a "multilinear extension of f over F" (e.g., in [2], [16] , and [19] ). Fix a function f: {0, 1} 'n ~ {0, 1} and a finite field F. We use or' i to denote the i polynomial xi and a 0 to denote the polynomial 1 -xi, (The "1" is the multiplicative identity of F.) Given an m-bit string a = a~ 9 9 "am, we define the polynomial ~, by
Now let the polynomial P(x) be given by
This is the arithmetization of f over F.
Here is an example. Let f(xlx2x3) = xl ~ x2 ~ x3, where ~ denotes exclusive-or. Then the arithmetization of f is the polynomial
At this point, we make two observations. First, in the definition of ~a, each variable can appear at most once in the product, and so 6,, is linear in each variable xi. Thus P is also linear in each variable xi (being the sum of monomials that are linear in xi). Second, for any x e {0, I} m, P(x) = f(x). This identity may be verified by noting that, in the sum given by the definition of P(x), all the terms are zero except for one that is equal to f(x).
Throughout this paper we assume that the finite field F has characteristic two. This allows us to choose an element of F uniformly at random simply by flipping coins. All of our definitions and results can be stated for F of characteristic greater than two as well. Certain protocols that work with probability one when F has characteristic two may fail with exponentially small probability when F has a higher characteristic, because a sequence of coin flips may fail to yield an element of F. Otherwise, everything that we present is the same for all finite fields.
Improved Locally Random Reductions
We now show how to improve the results of Beaver and Feigenbaum [3] and Lipton [15] . We first exhibit a parametrized family of random self-reductions for multivariate polynomials over sufficiently large finite fields. We then give, for any constant c > 0 and any m-bit function f, a (t, t Lm/c Ig mJ)-Iocally random reduction from f to some other function g.
Lemma 1. There is a polynomial Q(m) having the following proper~. Let d and t be numbers, and let F be a finite field of at least dt + 2 points. Let
P(xl ..... x,,,) be a polynomial in F[xl ...
.. Xm] of total degree at most d. Then P is locally random selfreducible in time Q(m + d + t + lgl FI). Furthermore, there is a single pair of functions (scatter, reconstruct) that serves as a locally random self-reduction for any P satisfying the above conditions.
Proof. Our proof proceeds along the lines of [3] , using the polynomial framework of [15] . First, we define scatter(X, r). Let X = (xl ..... Xm) ~ F m, and regard r as a set of mt random elements of F, denoted {Ci,j }, where 1 < i < m and I < j < t. Let Before describing reconstruct, we explain our definition of scatter. Define/3(z) by
/3(z) = P(pl(z) ..... pro(Z)).
Because P is of total degree at most d, and each Pi (z) is of degree t in z, the curve/3(z) is of degree at most dt. By definition,
P(Yk) = /3(ott)
and
We now define reconstruct. Recall that computing P(X) is equivalent to computing /3(0). Because/3 is a univariate polynomial of degree at most dt, P(O) may be recovered from/3 (ut) ..... /3 (Ud,+l) by Lagrangian interpolation. More explicitly, we define scatter by 
1-1 tk
,tL ~k --Olj j#k Thus, (scatter, reconstruct) has the correctness property required by Definition 1, and both scatter and reconstruct can be computed in the stated polynomial number of steps. Thus it suffices to show that, for any Xi, X2 ~ F m and any sequence (il ..... it), the distribution on (Yi, ..... Yi,) induced by scatter(Xi, r) is the same as that induced by scatter(X2, r), i.e., that (scatter, reconstruct) has the local randomness property also required by Definition 1. We show this by using the following well known fact about polynomial interpolation: Given points (xj, Yl) ..... (xt, Yl), where all the xi's are distinct and nonzero, and fixing co, there is exactly one polynomial of the form ctz t +... +cl z +co that agrees with all of these points. Thus, the fact that the ci.)'s are chosen independently and uniformly at random, combined with our definition of scatter, implies that, for any distinct a~, ..... ak, ~ F -{0}, and any X, Y~, ..... Yk, ~ F m, there is exactly one consistent value of C. Therefore, the distribution on (Y~, ..... Y~,) is uniform over (Fro) t, 
is a function g such that f is (t, t [m/c lg m)J )-locally random reducible to g in time Q(m).
Proof. Let F be a finite field of the form GF(2t), where l >_ [mt] . We first show how to reduce the computation of the arithmetization P (xl, .. 9 x,,,) of f over F to the computation of another multivariate polynomial P* (YR ..... yo) over F of total degree at most [m/c lgmJ. We then apply Lemma l to complete our proof. It is easy to verify that the values of the two monomials are equal, given the above change of variables. Because the arithmetization P of f is a sum of monomials in which each variable appears once, transforming each monomial of P as above yields a new polynomial P* of degree at most d. Finally, the subscripts taken by our variables yr can be renamed integers instead of sets. This purely syntactic transformation will sometimes be made for notational reasons, allowing us to say yl ..... y,, when convenient, but it is otherwise unnecessary. We can easily bound v, the number of variables in P*, by
Here is a simple example of the change of variables, with m = 6 and d = 3. Suppose that Note that it may he infeasible to write down P or P*, because the number of terms in one or both may be exponential in m. However, the reduction from P to P* only requires computing the new variables {Yr }, which can be done with a small number of multiplications in our field. For example, Yl3.41 is computed by multiplying x3 and x4.
We now define our reduction (scatter, reconstruct). On input X = xl ..... x,~, scatter(X, r) first computes x~ ..... x,, E F, where boolean O's are transformed into the 0 element in F, and boolean l's are transformed into the 1 element in F. This trivial transformation effects the reduction from f to P. Next, scatter computes the variables {yr}, effecting the reduction from P to P*. Note that P*(yl ..... y~) = f(xl .
We define reconstruct to be the same as in Lemma 1, except that it interprets 0 and 1 field elements as their boolean equivalents.
By Lemma 1, our reduction (scatter, reconstruct) always give the correct answer. Furthermore, the number of algebraic operations performed by reconstruct and scatter is bounded by some polynomial in v and t. Because v is bounded by some polynomial in m (depending on c), and the requisite field operations can be implemented in time polynomial in m and t, the total number of bit operations performed by reconstruct and scatter is polynomial in m and t.
[]
Zero-Knowledge Proofs on Committed Bits
In this section we formally define ideal bit commitment schemes and review the notion of zero-knowledge proofs on committed bits. In the protocols we describe, there is one party (the "prover") who commits to a set of bits and later proves assertions about these committed bits, and there is another party (the "verifier") who verifies the proofs on the committed bits. Intuitively, we think of an ideal commitment scheme as having physical envelopes that the prover can fill with information and place on the table. If the prover later opens an envelope, the verifier knows its contents have not been changed.
We are interested in the notion of zero-knowledge proof~ on committed bits. Such commitments have also been referred to as notarized envelopes. That is, one would like to commit to a set of bits b~ ..... b,,, and at some later time prove some predicate Q(bj ..... b,,,) on these bits, without revealing the values of bl ..... b,,, or other information not implied by Q(bl ..... bin).
Ideal commitment schemes were used in the construction of zero-knowledge proofs for predicates in NP (see 1121) and IP (see [ 14] ). Zero-knowledge proofs on committed bits were first used in the study of multiparty secure computation [1 1 ] and were based on complexity-theoretic assumptions. Simple schemes for basing zero-knowledge proofs on committed bits on ideal commitment schemes were developed not long thereafter (e.g., where Q' = Ai Q~ and each QI is a predicate on just three variables. Then Q(bl ..... b,,,) can be proved in zero-knowledge by committing to suitable values for yl ..... Yt and proving each of the predicates QI in zero-knowledge. However, such a transformation cannot be applied to arbitrary predicates and can be very unwieldy even for NP predicates. This technique also leaves open the question of whether the communication cost of zero-knowledge proofs on committed bits depends intrinsically on the computational complexity of the predicate to be proven. In the remainder of this section we answer this fundamental question in the negative.
Formal Definitions
In this section we describe the model of computation for interactive proofs in the presence of an ideal commitment scheme. We then go on to define (perfect) zero-knowledge proofs in this model.
Ideal Commitment Schemes
An ideal commitment scheme (ICS) can be thought of as a special type of channel that connects the prover P to the verifier V. When we run the protocol specified by P and V, any string that V writes down for P will be delivered (unmodified) to P; but messages sent from P to V are transmitted in the following way. Initialize S ~ 0 and then:
1. When P transmits on its channel to V a message commit(x, t), if there is no ordered pair (x', t) e S, then we set S ~ S t3 { (x, t) } and deliver to V the message t. If there is already an (x', t) e S, then the empty string is delivered to V. 2. When P transmits on its channel to V a message decommit(t), if there is some pair (x, t) ~ S, then we deliver to V the message (x, t). If there is no such pair (x, t) ~ S, then the empty string is delivered to V.
We could have provided P a "direct" channel to V, but this is trivially simulated with the channel above.
We say that P commits to x = Xl 9 9 x,, if P transmits in the course of the protocol:
commit(xt, x-bit-l) ..... commit(x,,, x-bit-m), (0, length-x=m).
We say that P reveals x if it sends the corresponding decommitments. We use the notation ChannelS__, v (X) to denote the message delivered when x is transmitted on the P ~ V channel, which is currently in state S. Note that this operation has a side effect on S.
ICS Protocol Execution
We model players P and V as {0, l}*-valued functions on initial input s 6 {0, 1}*, (verifier) view z 6 {0, 1, #}*, and coins flips r 6 {0, 1} ~176 An R(m)-round execution (P(sl), V(s2)) is defined by the following experiment: Set z ~--X; set S ~--0; choose random strings rK, r2 E {0, 1}~; then
for/ +-i to R([xl) do
We say that an execution of (P (S 1 ), V ($2)) accepts (or simply V accepts) if the last bit of the final value of z is !; else we say it rejects. The (verifier's) view is the random variable that gives s2, r2, and the final value of z. The communication complexi~, of an execution is the length of the final value of z.
I. Zero-Knowledge Proofv on Committed Bits
A zero-knowledge proof that predicate Q holds on committed bits Xl ..... xm is a like a neutral third party that does nothing but check that a(xt ..... xm) = 1, reporting the answer back to V. Nothing else is revealed.
As in the more customary setting of Goldwasser et al.
[13], we can formalize this idea by using a simulator: We require of any (possibly cheating) verifier that there be an algorithm that produces a distribution on (fake) views that coincides with the distribution on (real) views received by that verifier (when interacting with the prover who has initial input x, where Q(x) = 1). By effectively demonstrating that the verifier could have computed its view on its own (knowing nothing but Q(x) = 1), the existence of the simulator assures us that the verifier learns no more than it should.
Another way to model potential information leakage follows the notion of "witness indistinguishability" of Feige and Shamir [8] . In particular, for any equal length x and x' that satisfy predicate Q, the views that the verifier gets in these cases should be identical. This approach concerns itself more with hiding the input than with leaking extraneous information.
In the formalization we now give, we follow the second approach. Equivalent definitions can be formulated using simulators. Definition 2. An R (m )-round, e(m)-error ICS proof system for predicate Q is a pair of players (P, V) such that: 9 (Completeness) For any x such that Q(x) = 1, an R(Ixl)-round execution (P (x), V(Ixl)) accepts, and in it P commits to x. 9 (Soundness) For any player/5 that commits to its initial input x, if Q(x) = 0, then the R(IxD-round execution (/5(x), V(Ixl)) accepts with probability at most e(Ixl).
is constant we omit mention of these paramWhen R(m) is polynomial and e(m) < eters. If the communication complexity is bounded by a polynomial in m, we say that (P, V) is communication-efficient. Definition 3. An ICS proof system (P, V) for predicate Q is zero-knowledge if, for all f" and all xt,x2 such that Ixll = fx21 and Q(xl) = Q(x2) = 1, the view of (P(xl), f'(]x~ I)) is identical to the view of (P(x2), l~'([x21)).
A Communication-Efficient Protocol for Proofs on Committed Bits
We now present a new protocol, based on an ICS, for performing zero-knowledge proofs on committed bits. In our protocol a computationally unbounded prover P can prove arbitrary predicates in zero-knowledge to a computationally unbounded verifier V. Unlike the previous protocols, our protocol requires communication that is only polynomial in the number of committed bits, regardless of the circuit complexity of the predicate being proven. Note that the verifier must be computationally unbounded, because it must verify arbitrary predicates.
For our discussion, we often blur the distinction between boolean values and the 0 and 1 elements of a finite field. First, we use a standard trick of representing each bit to be committed as a random exclusive-or of two bits (equivalently, a random sum over G F(2)). The following simple protocols are used to commit and reveal bits.
Protocol COMMIT(XI ..... Xm). For 1 < i < m, P uniformly chooses x ~ x/ ~ {0, 1}, subject to xi = x~ (9 x/, and commits to x ~ and x/using the ICS.
Protocol REVEAL(i). The prover reveals x ~ and xi I using the ICS. V computes x i
x ~ (9 x/
It is easy to verifier that the value of a bit recovered during the REVEAL protocol must be the same as that during the COMMIT protocol. Furthermore, as soon as P has committed to x/~ and x/, he has implicitly committed to a bit xi that is guaranteed to be well defined.
The issue of committed bits' being well defined arises later but can be safely ignored at this point.
Our protocol for performing zero-knowledge proofs on a set of committed bits is based on the reduction given in the proof of Lemma l, where t = I. In order to prove the boolean predicate Q(xl ..... Xm), P and V first arithmetize Q, as in the proof of Theorem 2 (treating Q(X) as a boolean function that is l iff Q(X) is true). For the rest of the protocol, P must show that Q*(xl ..... xm) = l, where Q* is a degree _< m multivariate polynomial over a finite field F. F must have at least m + l distinct nonzero elements, denoted al, ..., 13tm+l 9 The zero-knowledge proof proceeds in two phases. In the commitment phase, P generates a run of the (1, m + 1)-locally random self-reduction on Q*, "breaks" the computation into random pieces, and commits to these pieces. In the challenge phase, V randomly chooses to see certain pieces of the reduction and uses this glimpse to verify probabilistically that the self-reduction was honest.
In the commitment phase, P uniformly generates {ci ~ F} and then follows the reduc- -cli) ). After generating this run of the reduction, P breaks up each ci, Ycj, zj, and w into halves whose sum (over F) is equal to the original and then commits to each half. Thus, we have ci = cl ) + c] , w = w ~ + w I , etc. We give the commitment stage of the protocol in Fig. 1 .
In the challenge phase of the protocol, V makes one of three general requests. He can ask P to reveal the "0 half" or the "1 half" of the self-reduction and verify a number of linear constraints. He can ask P to reveal Yj and zj for some j (by revealing both halves of all their relevant components) and verify that zj = Q*(Yj). Alternatively, he can ask P to reveal w (by revealing w ~ and w I) and verify that w = I. We give the challenge stage of the protocol in Fig. 2. 
Properties of Our Proof System
In this section, we argue that our protocols have the properties of a zero-knowledge proof system. We first show that our protocol is complete: If both parties behave properly, then 3. V asks P to reveal w ~ and wl and accepts iff w ~ + wl = 1. V always accepts a correct assertion. Next, we show that our protocol is weakly sound:
V rejects a false assertion with probability at least 1/poly(m). [] Lemmas 2 and 3 show that the protocol is a one-round, (1 -l/(m + 4))-error proof system. We next show that the protocol is zero-knowledge and then discuss how to reduce the probability that a false statement is accepted. One drawback to the scheme given above is the low probability that a verifier will catch an incorrect proof. This problem has been dealt with in previous protocols for zero-knowledge proofs on committed bits; the ideas used there carry over to our protocol without any conceptual alteration, and thus we simply state without proof the stronger results that we obtain using these standard techniques.
The basic idea is to run several independent copies of the protocols. Instead of breaking each xi into a single pair, (x/o, xi I ), P will break each xi into a sequence of independent pairs,
Similarly, P reveals xi by revealing all l pairs that he previously committed. 
This is accomplished by using protocol PROVE-EQUAL on the four committed bits.
Protocol PROVE-EQUAL(x 0, xl, x20' ?c~) /* Prove that x ~ ~.r I = x ~ @ x~ *// 1. P sends V the value of x ~ ~ x ~ 2. V uniformly chooses b c {0, 1 } and sends b to P. 3. P reveals x~ and x~ to V, who accepts iff x~ ~ x~ is equal to the value sent in Step 1.
The PROVE-EQUAL protocol is known to have the following properties: Property 1. Ifx ~ @x I :/: x ~ O.r~, then V rejects with probability at least 89 regardless of/6's strategy.
Property 2. Let x E {0, 1}, and let x ~ x I , x ~ x~ be chosen uniformly subject to x = x0 = x ~ 9
Then, for any V, the induced distribution on ~"s view of II: V rejects iff V ever rejected during Steps 2 or 3 of the loop. P aborts the protocol if ever asked to "reuse" a pair. Fig. 3 . Protocol for decreasing the probability of error.
followed by the revelation ofx ~ x l ' x2 ,0 x2 ,l may be generated by the following algorithm:
1. Choose v E {0, 1} at random and choose Yl, Y2 6 {0, 1} uniformly subject to v =Yl (9Y2-2. Send v to s On receipt of b from s set x~ = y, and x~ = y2, and send x~ and x b to s 3. Set xl -b = x (9 Xbl and x~ -h = x (9 x b, and send x ~ x I , x ~ and x~ to f'.
In particular, Property 2 implies that l)'s view through the PROVE-EQUAL protocol is independent of x.
In the protocol of Fig. 3 
Open Questions
Open questions abound, including: Question 1. Can Theorem 1 be improved so that fewer than t Lm/c Ig mj random instances are needed'? Alternatively, can a lower bound on the required number of random instances be proven?
Currently, it is not even known whether there is a function f that is not (1,2)-locally random reducible to any function g. Fortnow and Szegedy [ 10] show that there is an f that is not (1,2)-locally random reducible to a pair of functions (g t, g2), if the functions gi are required to be boolean and that the reduction have zero error probability.
Question 2. Is there a protocol for zero-knowledge proofs of arbitrary predicates on committed bits that is even more communication-efficient than the one we have presented? Question 3. Is there a fixed polynomial m' with the following property: For any polynomial-time predicate Q (x I ..... x,,), there is a zero-knowledge protocol that proves the value of Q on committed bits, has bit complexity m', and has a prover and verifier that both run in polynomial time? That is, if we restrict attention to poly-time Q's, is there a protocol that shares with the protocol presented in this paper the property that the (polynomial) communication complexity does not depend on the computational complexity of Q and has the additional property that the prover and verifier are poly-time?
